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The new Israeli Nationality Law – enacted in 2018 - is a natural, almost inevitable, 
product of the Zionist project in Palestine. In many ways, it is as relevant to the Zionist 
project as has been President Donald Trump’s recent decision to move the American 
embassy to Jerusalem and recognizing the city as Israel’s capital. Trump’s decision was 
very much in line with the policies of previous American administrations. In both cases, 
we have texts that clearly spell out attitudes and positions that were obfuscated in the 
past by more cautious discourses. Israeli and American leaders over the years 
subscribed to the same ideological positions that produced the Nationality Law and the 
decision to move the embassy to Jerusalem, respectfully. The coincidence of these two 
moments of Israeli and American clarity about Palestine is also not incidental – the 
policies of both sides dialectally feed each other, with the end result of an ongoing 
American immunity to the geography of disaster Israel wreaks in historical Palestine.  
In this article, I claim that the Nationality Law is a refined Israeli methodology of 
dealing with the inherent challenge facing any settler colonial project coveting 
someone’s else homeland but wishing to have it without the indigenous population. This 
methodology was first put in place in the late 19
th
 century and is adapted constantly, 
ever since, to changing circumstances and realities. More specifically, the Nationality 
Law responds to the reality Israel created in 1948; namely the fragmentation of the 
Palestinian people into discrete groups that were hitherto ruled by different means and 
now are been perceived as constituting a similar threat to the settler colonial state. The 
text of the law, thus, represents both the fundamental Zionist ideology as well as the 
adjustments of this ideology to present day realities. Texts such as the Nationality Law, 
which is a Constitutional Law in Israel, have deep origins stretching back to the 
beginning of the settler colonial project of Zionism in Palestine, and are informed by 
more immediate developments that give it its final shape. The text therefore embodies 
fundamental ideological positions of the Jewish State and charts the way forward for the 
Jewish State in the near and foreseeable future.  
The law begins with similar statements to those found in the Israeli Declaration of 
Independence promulgated on May 14, 1948 stating that Palestine is the historical 
birthplace of the Jewish people. However, the Declaration talks about the right of the 
Jews for «self determination based on historical, cultural and constant religious 
attachment to the land»
1
, while the Nationality Law defines Israel as a Jewish nation-
State based on «a moral, religious and natural right»
2
; not just an attachment. Thrown to 
the wind is the previous Zionist claim that creating a State as a secular project of 
modernization that would benefit all who live in historical Palestine.  
These two concepts, “the land of Israel” and “the State of Israel” are crucial for 
understanding both the law, the nature of the Zionist project and the future policies of 
the State of Israel (regardless of which government will be in power). The “land of 
Israel” reflects the spatial (geographical) dimension of the Zionist settler colonial 
project while the “State of Israel” represents the demographic aspect of the project. 
According to the law, there is only one national group within the State of Israel, and 
there will be only one such group when the State of Israel extends over other parts of 
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the land of Israel: clause 1.3 assert that «the right of national self determination in the 
state of Israel is uniquely Jewish (yihudi lam hayehudi)». This principle will be applied 
in the future to any additional part from the “land of Israel” that would be acquired 
through “Jewish settlement (Hityashvut Yehudit)”; namely colonization of parts of the 
land of Israel which are not yet the State of Israel
3
. 
In order to fully grasp the significance of the law and its impact mainly, but not 
exclusively, on the 1948 Palestinians, one has to recap the applicability of the settler 
colonial paradigm to the case of Zionism. Only through this paradigm, despite some of 
the Palestinian criticism directed at it and which I have discussed elsewhere
4
, one can 
appreciate the law both as an ideological statement and a plan for the future. The 
paradigm also provides a fresh view about past Palestinian resistance to the Zionization 
of Palestine as well some indication of how it can be challenged as part of the 
Palestinian liberation project.  
 
2. The Settler Colonial State 
 
We make a distinction between settler colonialism and classical colonialism. The 
settler colonialists are Europeans who were forced to leave Europe due to persecution or 
a sense of existential danger and who settled in someone else’s homeland. They were at 
first assisted by Empires, but soon rebelled against them as they wished to re-define 
themselves as new nations
5
.  
Their main obstacle however were not their empires but the native population. Their 
main challenge was the presence of indigenous populations in their newly coveted 
homelands. The encounter with the local people activated what Patrick Wolfe called 
«the logic of the elimination of the native»
6
. In some cases, this led to a genocide, as 
happened in North America, in others to apartheid as occurred in South Africa. In 
Palestine, the presence of native population led to ethnic cleansing operations that began 
in the mid-1920, culminated in the 1948 Nakba and continued ever since. The settlers 
also saw themselves as the indigenous and perceived the indigenous as aliens. This self-
indigenisation of the settler and de-indigenisation of the native in the case of Zionism 
was done in the name of the bible. And thus a secular Jewish settler movement 
demanded a new homeland by using a sacred religious text, the bible, as a scientific 
proof for their right to national sovereignty in the land. This implied that the 
Palestinians were the usurpers who took it over. This was a cynical approach, as the first 
settlers who came in between 1882 and 1914 could have not made it in Palestine 
without the help of the local Palestinians, but in their diaries and letters back home they 
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The settler colonial paradigm is particularly useful to explain what lays behind the 
massive ethnic cleansing operations of 1948. It differentiates between the will and the 
planning of Zionism, as a classical settler colonial movement wishing to have a new 
land without the people on it and the analysis that clarifies what enable this movement 
to perpetrate the plan so successfully. Hence the quality of the Palestinian leadership, 
the inability or in some cases unwillingness of the Arab world to help and the genuine 
or cynical wish of the Western world to compensate the Jews for the Holocaust all 
created a convenient historical movement for implementing the settler’s colonial plan.  
This is a very effective argument for the common Western pro-Israeli narrative 
casting the blame on the Palestinians for their catastrophe. In this respect the Palestinian 
acceptance or rejection of the UN partition plan was also less crucial in determining the 
fate of Palestine and its people in 1948. With their consent to the UN partition plan or 
without it, and with a more effective resistance or without it – the Palestinians faced in 
1948 a settler colonial ideology that had the unconditional support of the Western 
World. In fact, long before the Holocaust, the Zionist settlers acted upon “the logic of 
the elimination of then native” and the particular circumstances of 1948 provided the 
opportunity for partial realization of the vison of a de-Arabized Palestine
8
.  
However, in 1948, the Israeli forces expelled “only” half of the indigenous 
population and took over “only” 78% of the coveted new homeland. The inability to get 
rid of all the Palestinians and to takeover the whole land is an incompletion that 
explains the Israeli policy towards the Palestinians ever since 1948.  
This incompletion left a Palestinian minority with the newly found Jewish state and 
the settler colonial basic strategy informed the harsh Israeli policy towards these 
Palestinians left within Israel, the 1948 Arabs as they are named by the Palestinians or 
the Israeli Arabs as they are referred to by Israel. Until 1956, this community was 
subjected to further ethnic cleansing operations – this time against Palestinians who 
were citizens of the Jewish State whose Declaration of Independence promised to 
protect them, and yet they were expelled by the settler State (dozens of villages were 
depopulated in that period)
9
. Then they were put under a punitive military rule that 
robbed them of any normality in their life, where soldiers could arrest, shoot or banish 
them at will. The settler colonial State saw its Arab citizens as aliens with a potential of 
becoming hostile aliens at any given moment. 
The settler colonial paradigm explains also the Israeli policy leading to the June 1967 
war as well as its policy in the early years of the occupation of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip. In a recent book, «The Biggest Prison on Earth; A History of the Israeli 
Occupation», I have analysed the decision to occupy the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
in the June war of 1967, not as a defensive response to an all Arab attack (which is the 
common narrative), but rather as an Israeli solution to the incompletion of the 1948 
operations
10
. The geographical incompletion of the settler colonial project in 1948 
frustrated important sections of the Israeli political and military élite and they 
contemplated ever since the takeover of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The plans 
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moved into a more practical stage when in 1963 the principal politician, who objected to 
such a takeover, David Ben-Gurion, was removed from a significant role in Israel’s 
political life. In that year, a group of senior officers and officials drew a plan, called the 
Schaham plan, that would be implemented in 1967, to abolish the military rule imposed 
on the Palestinians inside Israel and moving this apparatus and impose it on the 
Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza strip after their planned occupation.
11
  
The military rule was only one method employed by Israel in the post 1967 period in 
its attempt to engage with the incompletion of the 1948 operations. The State used a 
mixture of legal and practical methods of policing the unwanted population, with 
different variations for different localities and the Nationality Law is yet just one more, 
additional, link in this chain of Israeli searches for what its leaders constantly call “the 
demographic problem” of the Jewish State. 
 
3. Practicing Settler Colonialism in the Occupied Territories, 1967-2007 
 
Already four years before the actual takeover, it was clear that with the coveted new 
territory, the settler state would have had new demographic problems. Like all settler 
colonial movements before them, the Zionist movement was troubled by the need to 
balance space and people on the way of turning a colony into a State. The more territory 
you get the more natives you rule. How to eliminate them as a demographic problem 
was the question, and the answer and methods depended on the capacity, circumstances 
and the ability of the indigenous population to resist. In this respect, the Nationality 
Law is the culmination of this trajectory that began in 1967. 
In the immediate aftermath of the June 1967 war, the decision of how to engage with 
the new territory and dealing with the new demographic challenge to the settler State 
rested with the 13
th
 government of Israel. It was the most consensual government Israel 
ever had or will have. Every shade of Zionism and Jewish orthodox anti-Zionism were 
represented in this unity government. This explains its ability to carve out a strategy that 
is still adhered to, today. 
The decision was not to annex officially the new territories, but also never give them 
up as part of the space of the future Jewish State. The settler State took over the 
remaining 22% of “the land of Israel”, under the pretext that the borders of 1948 were 
deemed indefensible and that the ancient biblical sites in the West Bank were sanctified 
as the heart of the ancient land of Israel without which the new nation State would not 
thrive. This is how the geography, the space, issue was solved.  
There was a debate on how much of the new territory should be annexed officially or 
directly (a debate that was not resolved until today). However, a Zionist consensus, still 
intact today, evolved that the guiding principle for making such decisions is partition; 
namely, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip could be best controlled if they were divided 
into a Jewish and non-Jewish area; or in the discourse of the Nationality law to the State 
of Israel and the land of Israel. The right wing in Israel still strives to turn most of the 
land of Israel (toady areas A and B of the West Bank, according to the Oslo accord, and 
if possible, the Gaza Strip) to the State of Israel (which de-facto exists in area C in the 
West Bank and might be de jure annexed at any given moment); the shrinking left and 
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centre wish to exclude the densely populated Palestinian areas (areas A and B) from the 
State of Israel, while hoping to annex part of area C (it is important to mention that area 
C is more than 60 per cent of the West Bank). 
The first post 1967 partition map was offered by Yigal Allon, one of the leaders of 
the Labour government. The Jewish space would be determined, he said in June 1967, 
by colonization (uvodt hityashvoyot). The same method is offered by the 2018 
Nationality Law. Allon drew a strategic map that left only densely populated Palestinian 
areas out of the Jewish West Bank and Gaza Strip. The problem for the 13
th
 government 
and the ones that followed it, the Golda Meir and Rabin governments, was that the new 
messianic movement, Gush Emunim, had a different map of colonization, based on the 
bible and the nationalistic imagination of Israeli archaeologists. They wanted to settle 
Jews precisely on densely populated Palestinian areas (which allegedly were situated on 
ancient biblical Hebrew places). This twin effort from above and below by 1974 had 
already defined the West Bank in particular as a partitioned space between a Jewish 
West Bank and a Palestinian one. The former continuously growing, the latter 
continuously shrinking. 
The State had to decide how to incorporate the territory without changing the 
demographic balance inside the Jewish State. The solution was found in the immediate 
aftermath of the war, and long after it. It was to enclave the people of the West Bank 
and the Gaza strip in mega prisons, that by now a third generation of hundreds of 
thousands of Israelis is involved in policing and maintaining. This reality created on the 
ground looks to them as normal and acceptable, despite wide international 
condemnation.  
The same government that decided to divide the 1967 occupied territories to “ours” 
and “theirs” also made the first and crucial decisions on the fate of the people living in. 
After some hesitations and quite substantial forced transfers of population, it was 
decided not to ethnically cleanse the population. The status of the population was to 
have some official connection with the previous powers, namely Jordan and Egypt, but 
basically, they were to remain as long as possible citizen-less citizens. The nationality 
law of 2018 at least clarified how this status would change should some of the 
Palestinians continued to live in areas annexed officially by Israel. At best they will be 
Israeli citizens, but under the confinements of the Nationality Law, and almost like 
newcomers, the law could be translated into harsher policies against them, if at all they 
would be granted full citizenship. Quite a few of the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, due 
to the annexation of the city, became Israeli citizens, yet they live a far more precarious 
legal life then Palestinians inside Israel. This could be also the best case scenario for 
Palestinians in a future annexed area C. If not they will remain inhabitants – Toshavim – 
or subjects – Netinim – of the Palestinian Authority if it continues to be in charge of 
what would remain of areas A and B in the West Bank. 
The next resolution was not to announce these decisions and engage in a peace 
process, with the help of the Americans, the aim of which was to obtain international, 
and if possible, an Arab, and later on even Palestinian, legitimization, or at least 
consent, to the way Israel wishes to have the territory without the people. The hope was 
that this legitimization would turn the Israeli plan into the end game of a future peace 
process. It was taken for granted that there will be genuine public debate in Israel about 
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the Israeli interpretation of what is peace and what is a solution will prevail. Nothing in 
what happened in the next 52 years indicates that these politicians did not get it right 
basing their hope on Palestinian fragmentation, Arab impotence, American immunity 
and global indifference.  
The other constituent element of the settle colonial policy after 1967 was how to rule 
and police the citizen-less citizens. In that last 52 years, the settler State employed two 
models for running millions of citizen-less citizens. Both models are mega prison 
models, with the logic of a prison and with only one difference, you can leave the prison 
and become a refugee with no right of return
12
.  
The open prison model is based on allowing freedom of movement inside the 
Palestinian areas and a controlled movement outside the Palestinian areas and between 
the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. No spatial growth for the Palestinians, no new 
villages or towns built on any land coveted for present and future Jewish settlements. 
The settler State did not tolerate any resistance to the geopolitical reality it created on 
the ground, but a certain level of autonomy was allowed in running municipal affairs. 
The first open prison was run between 1967 and 1987. Life was constantly monitored 
by the army and since 1981 by an outfit called the civil administration ruled by a set of 
regulations that gave the military unlimited power in the life of the citizens-less citizens. 
They were arrested without trial, expelled, their houses and business demolished, 
wounded and killed at the discretion of soldiers quite often of lower ranks.  
This was on offer between 1967 to 1987 for the first time and then between 1993 and 
2000 for the second time. It is on offer for areas A and B in the West Bank since 2004. 
Every new model of an open prison is worse for “the inmates” than the previous one. 
Privileges granted in the first term are reduced as long-term punishment for resisting the 
model. Thus, the second open prison, what one can call the open prison model of the 
Oslo accord which created mini prisons in areas A, B and C and the Gaza Strip, is far 
less open that the one in act until Oslo. This didactic approach is inbuilt into the Israeli 
perception – supported by Israeli orientalists – how best to teach the Palestinian lessons 
that would docile them and disempower them to the point of submission.  
The first Palestinian resistance to the open prison model was in the first intifada in 
1987. The punishment was replacing the open prison model with a maximum-security 
prison. Between 1987 and 1993, it included short term punitive actions – mass arrests 
without trial, wounding and killing demonstrators, massive demolition of houses, shut 
down of business and the education system and most importantly, further expropriation 
of land for sake of Jewish settlements. 
The Palestinian were offered a sophisticated open prison model in Oslo (regardless 
of how Palestinians and the world saw the accord). This is why the end of the 
occupation is not mentioned in the accord and the latter did not promise any end to the 
intensive Israeli involvement in the life of the Palestinians, even if the Palestinians 
would implement every other Israel demand within the Oslo accord.  
However, this model included the long-term punishment, the didactic one. Since 
1994 there was no freedom movement any more inside the Palestinian areas, let alone 
outside the Palestinian areas and the Judaization of the West Bank increased. The Gaza 
Strip was encircled already in 1994 with a barbered wire and the privileges granted in 
                                              
12




Nuovi Autoritarismi e Democrazie:  
Diritto, Istituzioni, Società  
 
n. 1/ 2019  ISSN 2612-6672 | 82 
 
the first model of the open prison for the Gazans to work in Israel was withdrawn. 
Another permanent punishment was the allocation of more water to the Gush Qafif 
settlements and cutting the strip into two parts controlled by Israel. 
If life under the first model of open prison was unacceptable to the Palestinians, the 
second one was worse, both in objective terms but even more importantly as it was 
presented as part of a peace process. The years devoted to Oslo and its implementation 
were creating life under conditions which were far worse than those in the first open 
prison model.  
The second uprising generated yet again a punitive maximum-security model: far 
worse in its short term punitive actions and the long term punishments. The massive use 
of military power included F-16 and tanks against civilian population in particular 
during the 2002 Defence Shield operation. An urbanicide we had witnessed in Syria, 
Iraq and Yemen recently and which was a prelude for the use of such power in the third 
model of the maximum security prison imposed on Gaza after the Hamas took over the 
strip in 2006. 
In 2007 the two models clearly transpired in the way Israel ruled the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip, still loyal to the main decision the 13
th
 government took in 1967: not to 
annex, not to expel and not to withdraw. The only decision discarded was the need to 
present it all as temporary measures pending peace, or to describe the open prison 
model as a peace plan. Even the Israeli public and politicians got tired from this charade 
and adopted what Prime Minister Ehud Olmert called unilateralism. Where there is 
collaboration there is an open prison model, in areas A and B, which include the long-
term punitive actions: hundreds of checkpoints and an apartheid wall meant to 
humiliate to the point of submission millions of people under the belief that this would 
discourage a third uprising. The checkpoints are the recruiting ground for a cruel 
network of informants that is meant to attack the dignity and self-respect on a whole 
nation that miraculously still succeeds in reaming human and steadfast today. And the 
closure of whole towns and villages with only one exit controlled day and night by the 
army and recently by private companies.  
Where there is resistance as in the Gaza Strip the maximum security, prison has 
turned into a ghetto, with Israel rationing food and calories, undermining the health and 
economy to the point of creating a human catastrophe as acknowledged by the UN 





4. The Next Target: The West Bankization of Israel 
 
All the Zionist parties of Israel in one form or another subscribe to these two models 
as the only game in town. The dominant political powers in Israel wish to import this 
twin model into Israel proper, vis-à-vis the Palestinians in Israel and they might succeed 
in doing so and the newly passed nationality law is an indication that this is indeed the 
future policy. This can also be seen when comparing the attitude to the Palestinian 
citizens by the two main parties that competed in the April 2019 elections: the Likud 
and Kachol-Lavan (Blue and White) party. Both declared clearly they do not see the 
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Palestinian parties as legitimate partner for any future coalition or government and do 
not oppose the Nationality Law.  
The same methodology employed of turning what remains of the land of Israel into 
the State of Israel is used in Israel proper. In the West Bank this modus operandi was an 
admixture of actions from below (by the messianic movement of Gush Emunim and 
other settlers off shoots) and from above (through government housing and expansion 
policy). These mixed policies of allegedly unauthorized colonization (quite often 
legitimized in hindsight) and planned Judaization is also employed inside Israel. This 
admixture consists, among other projects, of planting zealot settler communities on the 
seams of mixed towns in Israel (such as al-Lid, Acre, Jaffa and Ramleh); using 
archaeological excavation to cleanse the old city of Acre and Silwan, while 
governmental supported NGO, ELAD, is ousting people from their homes in Shaykh 
Jarah. There are also the more veteran programs of the Judaizaiton (yihud) of the 
Galilee and the Naqab. The spatial take over, very much as in the case of the West 
Bank, precedes the final definition of the status of the “unwanted” population. This has 
been the method of the Zionist colonisation of Palestine from the outset and it’s the way 
most settler colonial projects developed in the past.  
The right wing parties in Israel, in power since the late 1990s, like their Labour 
predecessors, do not particularly wish to leave such “national projects” in the hands of 
vigilantes (this is why after 1948 the government preferred a systematic and orderly 
looting of the possessions left behind by the Palestinian refugees and struggled against 
individual acts of robbery and pillage). As a national project from above the only 
difference between the Labour establishment and new centre-right one is the move from 
de facto actions on the ground to de-jure legislations.  
The de-facto actions are spatial strangulation, partition and settlement. The need to 
move a to de-jure policy stems from the wish to determine in a more final way the 
status of the Palestinian population as it is constantly perceived as the main strategic 
challenge for the success of the settler colonial project of Zionism. This was the main 
challenge for the settler colonial project of South Africa and the apartheid regime 
needed its own constitutional law to settle this challenge in 1948 – the slow rise to 
power of the centre-right collation in Israel delayed the legislation in full until the 2018 
Nationality Law.  
The Labour party imposed Judaization and partition on both sides of the green line 
by that dimming the difference in the existential realities for all the Palestinians living 
in historical Palestine (apart from the Gaza Strip) through the construction of purely 
Jewish spaces (from small settlements to towns) in the West Bank as well in Greater 
Jerusalem, the Galilee and the Negev and maintaining a discriminatory system in every 
aspect of life (although it was, and still is, in terms of individual freedom to hold Israeli 
citizenship for freedom of movement, employment and education). The centre-right 
coalition governments legalised, or in a way openly declared, this spatial apartheid 
policy with a series of legislation that began with a law in 2011 that allowed Jewish 
communities and settlements inside Israel to reject any Palestinian citizen of Israel 
wishing to live there.  
Another set of laws went beyond spatial confinement and strangulation. Long before 
the Nationality Law, the centre-right governments of Israel, attempted by law to deny 
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“tolerating” it in areas A in the West Bank and unable to impact it in the Gaza Strip 
unless Israel decided to re-occupy it). A law enacted in 2011 enabled the State to define 
any Palestinian citizen identifying with the actions of Palestinian resistance as a traitor 
or terrorist. The Nakba Law on that year banned public commemoration of the 1948 
events as a catastrophe by anyone connected to the State (such as schools or community 
centres)
14
. According to the Palestinian NGO, MADAR, the Israeli Knesset between 
2015 and 2018 passed 185 racist laws meant to consolidate an apartheid regime on both 
sides of the green line
15
. 
Hence the Nationality Law is the summation of these laws and not a new law. Like 
all the other laws and the politics on the ground, these are the 21
st
 century solutions to 
the conundrum of settler colonial project of a State wishing to be regarded as a 
democracy and can not implement massive ethnic cleansing.  
 
5. Further Implication and Resistance 
 
The Nationality Law is thus both a culmination of a wave of legislation meant to help 
the settler state to adapt to changing realities, and within a wider historical context, yet 
another method of dealing with both the incompletion of 1948 and the need to find a 
balance between exclusivity over space and overcoming “demographic threats”. The 
law also indicates a search in the future for a similar methodology for dealing with both 
Palestinian communities in at least part of the West Bank (in area C) and the Palestinian 
in Israel. 
It is quite possible that the bottom up and policies from above, inspired by this law, 
will continue in the future. From below, further expansion of exclusive Jewish spaces 
(or a municipality like Afula taking a vow never to allow Palestinian citizens to live in 
the city) will be followed by policies outlawing any further challenge to the Nationality 
Law’s definition of the Palestinian citizens as the people who speak a language that has 
a “special status”. Delegitimising the Islamic Movement was a first step that can be 
followed by further outlawing other Palestinian parties, such as Balad (Tajamu). 
Outlawing Palestinian parties or movements will be part of what one may call the West 
Bankization of Israel.  
The attempt to re-define who the Palestinians are encountered some unexpected 
hitches in the law as it included automatically also the “good Arabs”, such as the Druze 
who by serving in the Israeli army feel that they should be part of the privileged 
community of the Jewish society. The law defined exclusion according to a mother 
tongue, and not just service in the army. But all an all, the Zionist parties will continue 
to debate the best tactics for achieving the basic goal of the settler state – having the 
space without the indigenous people, but will not question the logic of its search; hence 
the correct prediction of many pundits that there is little hope of change from within the 
Jewish society in Israel. 
Palestinian resistance has never ceased from the very beginning of the colonization 
of Palestine. The incompletion of the 1948 ethnic cleansing and the continued 
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preoccupation of the settler state with the demographic conundrum are a testimony of its 
successes (as well as of failures). The struggle against the eviction as well as the 
struggle against the overall ideology and future plans are daily, quite often feeble and 
hampered by disunity and objective imbalance on the ground, the region and the world.  
There are however achievements that in time may prove as enhancers of a more 
successful liberation struggle in the future. Recognizing the settler colonial nature of 
Israel is quite common now among Western civil societies and beyond. There is 
therefore an increasing awareness that what is needed is not peace but decolonization, 
not just of the areas occupied in 1967, but of the whole of historical Palestine, one 
which will include the implementation of the Palestinian refugees right of return.  
Even beyond the civil society and among a growing number of Palestinians, there is 
a willingness to revisit the two-state solution as an open prison model and find a way in 
which one democratic State for all can be established. Two things have to be taken into 
account however: the first is the continued adherence of the representative bodies of the 
Palestinians until today to the two states solution; the second is that there is already a 
one settler apartheid Israel all over historical Palestine. Ergo, there as anticipation for a 
Palestinian change of mind, and international endorsement and measures such as those 
offered by BDS movement, as preliminary steps before there is no hope for generating a 
change from within the Jewish society.  
The Nationality Law can be a trigger for invigorated new definitions and strategy of 
liberation or alas we will have to wait for even a clearer, if it is at all possible, exposure 
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